Oriana Skylar Mastro on Deterrence by Denial at Doklam

May 22, 2019 posted by



welcome to nuclear learning and online initiative produced by the Simpson Center to facilitate the study of nuclear competition and dangers in South Asia our first open online course nuclear South Asia is available free of charge and nuclear learning that are G in this video was because Orianna scholar Mastro an assistant professor of security studies at the mme Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a Jean Kirkpatrick scholar at the American Enterprise Institute we discuss India's use of deterrence by denial to thwart Chinese coercion during the duel commence and off India took some very interesting steps to thwart Chinese coercion at Dhokla basically what they did was something called a deterrence by denial strategy this is the idea that India just made it impossible for China to continue on the path it wanted to continue on it wasn't about costs and it wasn't about arguments it was basically the Indian military put themselves physically in front of where China wanted to build a road I would argue that it deulim suggests that this type of strategy tends to be more effective than a deterrence by punishment strategy that's basically showing that you can impose costs on the other side that you could hurt the other side traditionally this is the tack that countries like the United States has used in the South China Sea and it hasn't been so effective this is not to say that by physically blocking China India has been a hundred percent effective I would assess that China's withdraw from this area is probably temporary and they're just going to be seeking alternative ways to pursue and promote their territorial claims in the future if you enjoyed this video please remember to subscribe to our YouTube channel and visit nuclear learning that our ji to enroll in nuclear South Asia

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